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Abstract
In this paper, we design and evaluate a convolutional au-
toencoder that perturbs an input face image to impart pri-
vacy to a subject. Specifically, the proposed autoencoder
transforms an input face image such that the transformed
image can be successfully used for face recognition but not
for gender classification. In order to train this autoencoder,
we propose a novel training scheme, referred to as semi-
adversarial training in this work. The training is facilitated
by attaching a semi-adversarial module consisting of an
auxiliary gender classifier and an auxiliary face matcher to
the autoencoder. The objective function utilized for training
this network has three terms: one to ensure that the per-
turbed image is a realistic face image; another to ensure
that the gender attributes of the face are confounded; and a
third to ensure that biometric recognition performance due
to the perturbed image is not impacted. Extensive experi-
ments confirm the efficacy of the proposed architecture in
extending gender privacy to face images.
Published in Proc. of 11th IAPR International Conference on Biometrics (ICB 2018). Gold Coast, Australia, Feb. 2018
1. Introduction
Biometric face recognition refers to the use of face im-
ages for recognizing an individual in an automated man-
ner [10]. A typical face recognition system employs a face
matcher that compares two face images and determines the
degree of similarity or dissimilarity between them. This
comparison operation can be used to (a) verify the claimed
identity of an input face image or (b) determine the identity
of an unknown face image by comparing it against a set of
known face images.
While face images collected by a biometric system are
expected to be used only for recognition of individuals [12],
recent research has established the possibility of automati-
cally deducing additional information about an individual
from their face image [2]. For example, information about
a person’s age, gender, race, or health can be obtained by
using a soft biometric classifier (e.g., a gender classifier)
that can extract this information from a single face image
[28]. While the extraction of soft biometric data (some-
times referred to as attributes) can be used to improve the
performance of a biometric system [26, 15], it also raises
several privacy concerns associated with gleaning informa-
tion without an individual’s consent. Further, such an auto-
mated analysis can be potentially misused for age-based or
gender-based profiling that can undermine the use of bio-
metrics in many applications [4].
Given these concerns, researchers have discussed the
possibility of de-identifying a face image prior to storing it
in a database [20]. While de-identification has tremendous
applications in surveillance systems, it can irrevocably com-
promise the biometric utility of a face image [6]. However,
in many applications, it is necessary to retain the biomet-
ric utility of the face image while suppressing the possibil-
ity of gleaning additional information, such as gender [18].
This type of differential privacy [21] is expected to enhance
the privacy of face images stored in a database while at the
same time ensuring that biometric recognition is not unduly
affected.
In this work, we develop a convolutional autoencoder
(CAE) that generates a perturbed face image that can be
successfully used by a face matcher but not by a gender
classifier. The proposed CAE is referred to as a semi-
adversarial network since its output is adversarial to the
gender classifier but not to the face matcher. The proposed
network can be easily appropriated for use with other at-
tributes (such as age or race). In principle, the design of the
semi-adversarial network can be utilized in other problem
domains where there is a need to confound some classifiers
while retaining the utility of other classifiers.
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1.1. Related work
A number of aspects of privacy protection has been stud-
ied in the biometric literature [19, 24, 21, 18]. On one
hand, there are face de-identification techniques [11, 20, 7]
where a face image is modified in order to confound a
face matcher. On the other hand, as inspired by the work
of Othman and Ross [21] and later promoted by Sim and
Zhang [27], the goal is to selectively confound or preserve
a set of attributes that can be deduced from face images.
Specifically, a few methods for suppressing the gender at-
tribute have been presented [25, 29, 21]. Recently, a new
method for protecting privacy with practical applications
for biometric databases was proposed in [18], where input
face images were modified with respect to a specific gender
classifier. In this case, perturbations were derived based on
a specific gender classifier, the perturbations did not signif-
icantly impact the match scores of a face matcher.
In this paper, we provide an alternative solution by de-
signing a convolutional autoencoder that transforms input
images such that the performance of an arbitrary gen-
der classifier is impacted, while that of an arbitrary face
matcher is retained. The contributions of this paper, in
this regard, are the following: (a) formulating the privacy-
preserving problem in terms of a convolutional autoencoder
that does not require prior knowledge about the gender clas-
sifier nor the face matcher being used; (b) incorporating an
explicit term related to the matching accuracy in the objec-
tive function which ensures that the utility of the perturbed
images is not negatively impacted; (c) developing a gen-
eralizable solution that can be trained on one dataset and
applied to other previously unseen datasets.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work where
adversarial training is used to design a generator compo-
nent that is able to maximize the performance with re-
spect to one classifier while minimizing the performance
with respect to another. Experimental results show that
the proposed method of semi-adversarial learning for multi-
objective functions is efficient for deriving perturbations
that are generalizable to other classifiers that were not used
(or not available) during training.
2. Proposed method
2.1. Problem formulation
Let X ∈ Rm×n×c denote a face image having c chan-
nels each of height m and width n. Let fG(X) denote a bi-
nary gender classifier that returns a value in the range [0, 1],
where 1 indicates a “Male” and 0 indicates a “Female”. Let
fM (X1, X2) denote a face matcher that computes the match
score between a pair of face images, X1 and X2. The goal
of this work is to construct a model φ(X), that perturbs an
input image X such that the perturbed image X ′ = φ(X)
has the following characteristics: (a) from a human per-
spective, the perturbed image X ′ must look similar to the
original input X; (b) the perturbed image X ′ is most likely
to be misclassified by an arbitrary gender classifier fG(X);
(c) the match scores, as assessed by an arbitrary biometric
matcher fM , between perturbed image X ′ and other unper-
turbed face images from the same subject, are not impacted
thereby retaining verification accuracy.
This goal can be expressed as the following objective
function, which minimizes a loss function J consisting of
three disjoint terms corresponding to the three characteris-
tics listed above:
J(X, y,X ′; fG, fM ) =
λDJD(X,X
′) + λGJG(y,X ′; fG) + λMJM (X,X ′; fM ),
(1)
where, X is the input image, y is the gender label of X ,
and X ′ is the perturbed image. The term JD(X,X ′) mea-
sures the dissimilarity between the input image and the per-
turbed image produced by a decoder φ(X) to ensure that
the perturbed images still appear as realistic face images.
The second term, JG(y,X ′; fG), measures the loss asso-
ciated with correctly predicting gender of perturbed image
X ′ using fG, to ensure that the accuracy of the gender clas-
sifier on the perturbed image X ′ is reduced. The third
term, JM (X,X ′; fM ), measures the loss associated with
the match score between X and X ′ computed by fM . This
term ensures that the matching accuracy as assessed by fM
is not substantially diminished due to the perturbations in-
troduced to confound the gender classifier.
In order to optimize this objective function, i.e., min-
imizing gender classifier accuracy while maximizing the
biometric matching accuracy and generating realistic look-
ing images, we design a novel convolutional neural network
architecture that we refer to as a semi-adversarial convolu-
tional autoencoder.
2.2. Semi-adversarial network architecture
The semi-adversarial network introduced in this paper
is significantly different from Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs). A typical GAN has two components: a
discriminator and a generator. The generator learns to gen-
erate realistic looking images from the training data, while
the discriminator learns to distinguish between the gener-
ated images and the corresponding training data [5, 26].
In contrast to regular GANs consisting of a generator and
a single discriminator, the proposed semi-adversarial net-
work attaches two independent classifiers to a generative
subnetwork. Unlike the generator subnetwork of GANs
that is trained based on the feedback of one classifier, the
semi-adversarial configuration proposed in this paper learns
to generate image perturbations based on the feedback of
two classifiers, where one classifier acts as an adversary of
the other. Hence, the semi-adversarial network architecture
we propose consists of the following three different subnet-
works (Fig. 1): (a) a trainable generative component in form
of a convolutional autoencoder (subnetwork I) for adversar-
ial learning; (b) an auxiliary CNN-based gender classifier
(subnetwork II); (c) an auxiliary CNN-based face matcher
(subnetwork III).
The auxiliary gender classifier as well as the auxiliary
matcher1 are detachable parts in this network architecture
used only during the training phase. In contrast to GANs,
the generative component of this proposed network archi-
tecture is a convolutional autoencoder (section 2.2.1), which
is initially pre-trained to produce an image that closely re-
sembles an image from the training set after incorporat-
ing gender prototype information (section 2.2.2). Then,
during further training, feedback from both an auxiliary
CNN-based gender classifier and an auxiliary CNN-based
face matcher are incorporated into the loss function (see
Eqn. (1)) to perturb the regenerated images such that the
error rate of the auxiliary gender classifier increases while
that of the auxiliary face matcher is not unduly affected.
An overview of this semi-adversarial architecture is
shown in Fig. 1, and the details are further described in the
following subsections.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the semi-adversarial neu-
ral network architecture designed to derive perturbations that are
able to confound gender classifiers while still allowing biomet-
ric matchers to perform well. The overall network consists of
three sub-components: a convolutional autoencoder (subnetwork
I), an auxiliary gender classifier (subnetwork II), and an auxiliary
matcher (subnetwork III).
2.2.1 Convolutional autoencoder
The architecture of the convolutional autoencoder sub-
network that modifies and reconstructs the input image in
three different ways is shown in Fig. 2. The input to this
sub-network is a gray-scale face image of size 224 × 224
concatenated with a same-gender prototype, PSM (Fig. 3).
The input is then processed through the encoder part con-
sisting of two convolutional layers; each layer is followed
1The term “auxiliary” is used to indicate that these subnetworks do not
correspond to pre-trained gender classifiers or face matchers, but rather
classifiers that are generated from the training data. Note that such a for-
mulation makes the semi-adversarial network generalizable.
by a leaky ReLU activation function and an average pooling
layer, resulting in feature maps of size 56× 56× 12. Next,
the outputs of the encoder are passed through a decoder with
two convolutional layers each, followed by a leaky ReLU
activation and an upsampling layer using two-dimensional
nearest neighbor interpolation. The output of the decoder is
a 224× 224× 128 dimensional feature map.
The feature maps from the decoder output are then con-
catenated with either same-gender (PSM ), neutral-gender
(PNT ), or opposite-gender (POP ) prototypes in the proto-
combiner module (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). The proto-
combiner module is followed by a final convolutional layer
and a sigmoid activation function yielding a reconstructed
image X ′SM , X
′
NT , or X
′
OP , depending on the gender-
prototype used. The autoencoder described in this section
contains five trainable layers. Those layers are pre-trained
using an information bottleneck approach [8] to retain the
relevant information from both the original image and the
same-gender prototype. This is sufficient to reconstruct re-
alistic looking images by minimizing JD(X,X ′), which
measures the dissimilarity between the gray-scale input im-
ages and the perturbed images by computing the sum of the
element-wise cross entropy between input and output (per-
turbed) images. After pre-training, this subnetwork is fur-
ther trained by passing its reconstructed images to two other
sub-networks: the auxiliary gender predictor and the auxil-
iary face matcher (Fig. 1). The gender prototypes, as well
as the two subnetworks, are described in the following sub-
sections.
Figure 2. Architecture of the autoencoder augmented with gender-
prototype images. The encoder receives a one-channel gray-scale
image as input, which is concatenated with the RGB channels of
the same-gender prototype image. After the compressed represen-
tation is passed through the decoder part of the autoencoder for
reconstruction (128 channels), the proto-combiner concatenates it
with the RGB channels of a same-, neutral-, or opposite-gender
prototype resulting in 131 channels that are then passed to a final
convolutional layer.
2.2.2 Gender prototypes
The 224 × 224 male and female RGB gender prototypes
(Pmale, Pfemale) were computed as the average of all 65,160
male images and 92,190 female images, respectively, in the
CelebA training set [14]. Then, the same-gender (PSM ) and
opposite-gender (POP ) prototypes, which are being con-
catenated with the input image and combined with the au-
toencoder output (Fig. 2), are constructed based on the
ground-truth label y, while the neutral-gender prototype is
computed as the weighted mean of male and female proto-
types (Fig. 3):
• Same-gender prototype, PSM : yPmale+(1−y)Pfemale
• Opposite-gender prototype, POP : (1 − y)Pmale +
yPfemale
• Neutral prototype, PNT : αFPfemale + αMPmale
Figure 3. Gender prototypes used to confound gender classifiers
while maintaining biometric matching during the semi-adversarial
training of the convolutional autoencoder.
Here, αF is the proportion of females in the CelebA
training set and αM is the proportion of males. The con-
volutional autoencoder network (summarized in Fig. 1 and
further illustrated in Fig. 2) is provided with same-gender
prototype images (female or male corresponding to the
ground truth label of the input image), which are concate-
nated with the input image before being transmitted to the
encoder module in order to derive a compressed representa-
tion of the original image along with the same-gender pro-
totype information. After the decoder reconstructs the orig-
inal images, the three different gender-prototypes are added
as additional channels via the proto-combiner (Fig. 2).
The final convolutional layer of the autoencoder pro-
duces three different perturbed images: X ′SM (obtained
when the same-gender prototype is used), X ′NT (when the
neutral prototype is used), and X ′OP (when the opposite-
gender prototype is used).
Pre-training: During pre-training, to ensure that the con-
volutional autoencoder is capable of reconstructing the orig-
inal images, only the same gender perturbations (X ′SM )
were considered in the cross-entropy cost function.
Training: For the further training of the autoencoder, to
confound the auxiliary gender classifier and ensure high
matching accuracy of the auxiliary matcher, both the per-
turbed outputs using same- and opposite-gender prototypes
were passed through the auxiliary gender classifier, to en-
sure that the perturbation made using the same-gender pro-
totype produces accurate gender prediction while perturba-
tions made using the opposite-gender prototype confounds
the gender prediction. The perturbed outputs due to the neu-
tral prototypes are not incorporated in the loss function, and
are only used for evaluation purposes.
2.2.3 Auxiliary CNN-based gender classifier
The architecture of the auxiliary CNN-based gender clas-
sifier, which consists of six convolutional layers and two
fully connected (FC) layers, is summarized in Fig. 4. Each
convolutional layer is followed by a leaky ReLU activation
function and a max-pooling layer that reduces the height
and width dimensions by a factor of 2, resulting in feature
maps of size 4 × 4 × 256. Passing the output of the sec-
ond FC layer through a sigmoid function results in class-
membership probabilities for the two labels: 0:“Female”
and 1:“Male”. This network was independently trained on
the CelebA-train dataset by minimizing the cross-entropy
cost function, until its convergence after five epochs; the
gender prediction accuracy of the auxiliary network when
tested on the CelebA-test set was 96.14%. During training,
two dropout layers with drop probability of 0.5 were added
to the FC layers for regularization. However, these dropout
layers were removed when this subnetwork was used for de-
riving perturbations as part of the three-subnetwork neural
network architecture shown in Fig 1.
As this CNN-based gender classifier was only used for
training the convolutional autoencoder for generating per-
turbed face images, and not for further evaluation of this
model, it is referred to as auxiliary gender classifier to dis-
tinguish it from the gender classifiers used for evaluation.
Figure 4. Architecture of the CNN-based auxiliary gender classi-
fier that was used during the training of the convolutional autoen-
coder. This classifier was used as an auxiliary (fixed) component
in the final model to derive the image perturbations according to
the objective function described in Section 2.1.
2.2.4 Auxiliary CNN-based face matcher
As discussed in Section 2.1, the loss function contains a
term JM (X,X ′; fM ) to ensure good face matching accu-
racy despite the perturbations introduced to confound the
gender classifier. To provide match scores during the train-
ing of the autoencoder subnetwork, we used a publicly
available VGG model as described by Parkhi et al. [22]
consisting of 16 weight layers. This VGG subnetwork pro-
duces face descriptors which are vector representations of
size 2622 extracted from RGB face images. The publicly
available weight parameters of this network were used with-
out further performance tuning.
In addition, as the open-source VGG-face network ex-
pects RGB images as inputs, we modified the convolutional
filters of the first layer by adding the three filter matrices re-
lated to the input channels, for compatibility with the single-
channel gray-scale input images. As this CNN-based face
matcher was only used for training the convolutional au-
toencoder for generating perturbed face images, and not for
further evaluation of this model, it is referred to as auxil-
iary matcher to distinguish it from the commercial match-
ing software used for evaluation.
2.3. Loss function
After pre-training the convolutional autoencoder de-
scribed in Section 2.2.1, it is connected to the other two
subnetworks (the auxiliary CNN-based gender classifier de-
scribed in Section 2.2.3 and the auxiliary CNN-based face
matcher described in Section 2.2.4) for further training.
During the pre-training stage, the loss term JD(X,X ′) was
used to ensure that the convolutional autoencoder is capa-
ble of producing images that are similar to the input im-
ages. The loss term is computed as the element- or pixel-
wise cross entropy, S, between input and output (perturbed)
images:
JD(X,X
′
SM ) =
2242∑
k=1
S
(
X(k), X
′(k)
SM
)
. (2)
Next, to generate the perturbed images X ′SM , X
′
NT , or
X ′OP (based on the type of gender-prototype used) such that
gender classification is confounded but biometric matching
remains accurate, two loss terms, JG and JM , were used.
The first loss term is associated with suppressing gender in-
formation in X ′OP and preserving it in X
′
SM :
JG (y,X
′
SM , X
′
OP ; fG) =
S (y, fG(X
′
SM )) + S (1− y, fG(X ′OP )) , (3)
where, S(t, pˆ) denotes the cross-entropy cost function using
target label t and the predicted class-membership probabil-
ity pˆ. Note that in this loss function, we use the ground
truth labels for X ′SM so that the gender of X
′
SM is cor-
rectly predicted, while we use flipped labels for X ′OP so
that the gender of perturbed image X ′OP is incorrectly pre-
dicted. We found that without the use of this configuration
for X ′SM and X
′
OP , the network will perturb the input im-
age, X , such that perturbations are overfit to the auxiliary
gender classifier that is used during training.
The second loss term, JM , measures the matching sim-
ilarity between input image X and the perturbed image
X ′SM generated from the same-gender prototype:
JM (X,X
′
SM ;Rvgg) = ‖Rvgg(X ′SM )−Rvgg(X)‖22 ,
(4)
where, Rvgg(X) indicates the vector representation of im-
age X obtained from the VGG-face network [22]. The total
loss is then the weighted sum of the two loss terms JG and
JM :
Jtotal (X, y,X
′
SM , X
′
OP ; fG, Rvgg) =
λGJG(y,X
′
SM , X
′
OP ; fG) + λMJM (X,X
′
SM ;Rvgg).
(5)
Jtotal was then used to derive the loss gradients with re-
spect to the parameter weights of the convolutional autoen-
coder during the training stage, to generate perturbations
according to the objective function (Section 2.1). Note that
the coefficients λM and λG in Eqn 5 constitute additional
tuning parameters to re-weight the contributions of JG and
JM toward the total loss. In this work, we did not optimize
λM and λG, however, and used a constant of 1 to weight
both JG and JM equally.
2.4. Datasets
The original dataset source used in this work is the
large-scale CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA) dataset [14],
which consists of 202,599 face images in JPEG format for
which gender attribute labels were already available with
the dataset. The dataset was randomly divided into 162,079
training images (CelebA-train) and 40,520 images for test-
ing (CelebA-test). The CelebA-train dataset was used to
train the gender classifier (Section 2.2.3), as well as the con-
volutional autoencoder (Section 2.2.1).
In addition to the CelebA-test dataset, three publicly
available datasets were used for evaluation only: MUCT
[17], LFW [9] and AR-face [16] databases. The final com-
positions of these datasets, after applying a preprocessing
step using a deformable part model (DPM) as described by
Felzenszwalb et al. [3] to ensure that all images have the
same dimensions (224 × 224), are summarized in Table 1.
The resulting perturbed images obtained from the CelebA-
test, MUCT, LFW, and AR-face datasets, were used to mea-
sure the effectiveness of modifying the gender attribute as
assessed by a commercial gender classifier (G-COTS) and
a commercial biometric matcher (M-COTS, excluding AR-
images labeled as occluded due to sunglasses or scarfs).
Table 1. Sizes of the datasets used in this study for training and
evaluation. CelebA-train was used for training only, while the
other four datasets were used to evaluate the final performance of
the trained model.
Dataset Train # Images # Male # Female
CelebA-train yes 157,350 65,160 92,190
CelebA-test no 39,411 16,318 23,093
MUCT no 3754 131 145
LFW no 12,969 4205 1448
AR-face no 3286 76 60
2.5. Implementation details and software
The convolutional autoencoder (Section 2.2.1), auxiliary
CNN-based gender classifier (Section 2.2.3) and the auxil-
iary CNN-based face matcher (Section 2.2.4) were imple-
mented in TensorFlow [1] based on custom code for the
convolutional layers and freezing the parameters of the gen-
der classifier and face matcher during training of the autoen-
coder subnetwork [23].
3. Experimental Results
After training the autoencoder network using the
CelebA-train dataset as described in Section 2.2.1, the
model was used to perturb images in other, independent
datasets: CelebA-test, MUCT, LFW, and the AR-face
database. For each face image in these datasets, a set of
three output images was reconstructed using same-gender,
neutral-gender, and opposite-gender prototypes. Further-
more, our results are compared with the face-mixing ap-
proach proposed in [21]. Examples of these reconstructed
outputs for two female face images, and two male face im-
ages are shown in Fig. 5.
3.1. Evaluation and verification
The previously described auxiliary CNN-based gender
classifier (Section 2.2.3) and auxiliary CNN-based face
matcher (Section 2.2.4) were not used for the evalua-
tion of the proposed semi-adversarial autoencoder as these
two subnetworks were used to provide semi-adversarial
feedback during training. The performance of the semi-
adversarial autoencoder is expected to be optimally biased
when tested using the auxiliary gender classifier and auxil-
iary face matcher. Thus, we used independent gender classi-
fication and face matching software for evaluation and veri-
fication instead, to represent a real-world use case scenario.
Two sets of experiments were conducted to assess the
effectiveness of the proposed method. First, two indepen-
dent software for gender classification were considered: the
popular research software IntraFace [13] as well as a state-
of-the-art commercial software, which we refer to as G-
COTS. Second, a state-of-the-art commercial matcher that
Figure 5. Example input images with their reconstructions using
same, neutral, and opposite gender prototypes from the CelebA-
test (first two rows) and MUCT (last two rows) datasets.
has shown excellent recognition performance on challeng-
ing face datasets was used to evaluate the face matching per-
formance; we refer to this commercial face matching soft-
ware as M-COTS.
3.1.1 Perturbing gender
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed scheme
in perturbing gender, the reconstructed images using
the proposed semi-adversarial autoencoder from the four
datasets were analyzed. The Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) curves for predicting gender using IntraFace
and G-COTS from the original images and the perturbed
images are shown in Fig. 6.
We note that gender prediction via IntraFace is heavily
impacted when using different gender prototypes for im-
age reconstruction. We observe that the performance of
IntraFace on AR-face images after opposite-gender pertur-
bation is very close to random (as indicated by the near-
diagonal ROC curve in Fig. 6(a)-(d)). The performance
of G-COTS proves to be more robust towards perturba-
tions, compared to IntraFace; however, the ROC curve cor-
responding to the opposite-gender prototype, shows a sub-
stantial deviation from the ROC curve of the original images
(Fig. 6(e)-(h)). This observation indicates that the opposite-
gender prototype perturbations have a substantial, negative
impact on the performance of state-of-the-art G-COTS soft-
ware, thereby extending gender privacy.
The exact error rates in predicting the gender attribute
of face images using both IntraFace and G-COTS software
are provided in Table 2 for the original images and the per-
turbed images using opposite-gender prototypes. The quan-
titative comparison of the error rates indicates a substantial
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Figure 6. ROC curves comparing the performance of IntraFace
(a-d) and G-COTS (e-h) gender classification software on origi-
nal images (“Before”) as well as images perturbed via the con-
volutional autoencoder model (“After”) on four different datasets:
CelebA-test, MUCT, LFW, and AR-face.
Table 2. Error rates in gender prediction using IntraFace and G-
COTS gender classification softwares on the original datasets be-
fore and after perturbation. Note the substantial increase in the
prediction error upon perturbation via the convolutional autoen-
coder model using opposite-gender prototypes.
Software Dataset Original Perturbed Ref. [21](before) (after OP)
IntraFace
CelebA-test 19.7% 39.3% 44.6%
MUCT 8.0% 39.2% 57.7%
LFW 33.4% 72.5% 70.9%
AR-face 16.9% 53.8% 54.2%
G-COTS
CelebA-test 2.2% 13.6% 42.4%
MUCT 5.1% 25.4% 53.9%
LFW 2.8% 18.8% 46.1%
AR-face 9.3% 26.9% 40.6%
increase in the prediction error rates when image datasets
were perturbed using opposite-gender prototypes. Note that
in the case of G-COTS software, perturbations made by the
face mixing scheme proposed in [21] result in higher error
rates. On the other hand, the additional advantage of our
approach is in preserving the identity, as we will see in the
next section.
3.2. Retaining matching accuracy
The match scores were computed using a state-of-the-
art M-COTS software and the resulting ROC curves are
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Figure 7. ROC curves showing the performance (true and false
matching rates) of M-COTS biometric matching software on the
original images (“Before”) compared to the perturbed images
(“After”) generated by the convolutional autoencoder model using
same-, neutral-, or opposite-gender prototypes for three different
datasets: (a) MUCT, (b) LFW, and (c) AR-face.
shown in Fig. 7. While the matching term, JM , in the
loss function is directly applied to reconstructed outputs
from same-gender prototype,X ′SM , the reconstructions that
use neutral- or opposite-gender prototypes are not directly
subject to this loss term (see Section 2.3). As a result,
the ROC curve of the reconstructed images coming from
same-gender prototype appear much closer to the original
input compared to the reconstructed images from neutral-
and opposite-gender prototypes. Overall, we were able
to retain a good matching performance even when using
opposite-gender prototype. On the other hand, the ROC
curves obtained from outputs of the mixing approach pro-
posed in [21] are heavily impacted, resulting in de-identified
outputs (which is not desirable in this work).
Finally, the True Match Rate (TMR) values at a False
Match Rate of 1% are reported in Table 3. The perturbed
images from all three datasets show TMR values that are
very close to the value obtained from the unperturbed orig-
inal dataset.
4. Conclusions
In this work, we focused on developing a semi-
adversarial network for imparting soft-biometric privacy to
face images. In particular, our semi-adversarial network
perturbs an input face image such that gender prediction is
Table 3. True (TMR) and false (FMR) matching rates (measured at
values of 1%) of the independent, commercial M-COTS matcher
after perturbing face images via the convolution autoencoder using
same (SM), neutral (NT), and opposite (OP) gender prototypes,
indicating that the biometric matching accuracy is not substantially
affected by confounding gender predictions.
Dataset Original Perturbed(before) (SM) (NT) (OP)
MUCT 99.88 % 99.79% 99.57% 98.44%
LFW 90.29% 90.02% 88.47% 83.45%
AR-face 94.97% 94.11% 91.95% 90.81%
confounded while the biometric matching utility is retained.
The proposed method uses an auxiliary CNN-based gen-
der classifier and an auxiliary CNN-based face matcher for
training the convolutional autoencoder. The trained model
is evaluated using two independent gender classifiers and
a state-of-the-art commercial face matcher which were un-
seen during training. Experiments confirm the efficacy of
the proposed architecture in imparting gender privacy to
face images, while not unduly impacting the face matching
accuracy.
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